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No. 74-1471 
TSC INDUSTRIES, INC. 
v. 
NORTHWAY, INC. 
SUMMARY: Resp Northway, plaintiff below, is a holder of the securities of ---
TSC Industries, petr here and defendant below. Petr TSC was acquired by petr -----
National Industries, Inc., in a stock- for- stock purchase. Resp filed suit under § l4(a ) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 19 34, alleging that the joint proxy statement filed by 
TSC and National Industries in connection with the exchange offer was materially 
misleading in its omission of certain details of the interrclati<:''1ship of the merger 
- 2 -
1/ 
partners. On res p 1 s motion for summary judgment on the is sue of liability, USDC 
' . 
(N.D. Ill) (McLaren ) denied the motion since materiality of the omissions was not -
established as a matter of law and was a jury question. On § ·1292 appeal, the 7th 
Circuit reversed, holding that certain omissions were material as a matter of lav-' --------since they were 11 of such a character that [they l might have been considered 
important by a reasonable shareholder. 11 Petrs now seek review by cert of CA 7 1 s 
decision arguing: 
(a) the standard for materiality expounded by CA 7 is 
in direct conflict with the 11 significant propensity11 test 
adopted in Mills v. Electric Auto- Lite Co., 396 U.S. 
375 (1970), and with the decisions of various CA's; 
(b) CA 7 erred in holding the omissions involved in this 
case to be material as a matter of law. 
FACTS: After acquiring 34o/o of TSC 1 s stock and placing five of its nominees 
I,\._../ on TSC's board of directors, National Industries proposed that TSC sell its assets to 
National in exchange for National stock. This sale of assets and liquidation reatJired c. 
shareholder vote under state corporate law and, as required by § 14(a) of the 1934 Ac:, 
TSC and National distributed a proxy statement to their shareholders. The non-
National nominees on the TSC board unanimonsly approved the proposed asset ---... --~ -- --
acquisition and liqnidation as did the TSC shareholders. After the 1nerger was 
I 
cu1rxW1ated, resp Northway bronght this snit, alleging, inter alia, certain material 
omissions in the proxy statement. 
1/ 
Resp also filed certain claims against the controlling shareholders of TSC 
which are not here in is sne. 
( 
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First, re s p noted that th e prox y s t a tenent failed to note that TSC a nd Nationa 1 
had filed Schednle 13d 1 s with the SEC as reqnir~ d by § 13d of the 19 34 Ac t s t a tin g t!:c.t 
National conld be deemed the 11 parent 11 of TSC within the meari.~ng of that prov ision by 
reason of its 33% of TSC. Beyond this, althongh the proxy statement did note that ~:. 
ont of the 10 TSC directors were National nominees, it failed to note that National 1 s 
President and Vice- President were respectively Chairmen of the TSC board of 
directors and execntive committee. Witho,,t snbstantial explanation, CA 7 held thes e 
omissions to be material as a matter of law. Petn at 13a-14a. 
Second, althongh the proxy statement revealed the cnrrent market val,e of tl:e 
shares of National to be received by TSC shareholders [$16. 19 per common share oi 
'' -..' TSC], it failed to inclnde the prediction of an nnderwriter that the received shares ......_. 
~
would bring only $14.50 per TSC share after the exchange dne to a dim.Hnitioa in v a l• · e 
of certain National warrants incl,ded in the package. The predicted change in v alne 
wonld rednce the premi,,m over present valne received by the TSC shareholders fr on: 
$3. 23 per TSC share to $1. 48 per share. CA 7 held the materiality of this omission 
to be obvio,s. Petn at 18a. 
Finally CA 7 fonnd it a material omission to fail to disclose the fact that 
National had retained as a $12,000 a year consnltant the President of a m,t,al f,n d 
which had p11rchased s•,bstantial qnantities of National stock amo•,nting to abo,t sa-
? 
of the yearly float in National. This was tr11e since some shareholders might h a\·e 
drawn an inference of coll,sion from these facts. 
CONTENTIONS: ( 1) CA 7 at some length expo•,nds its view of materia lity :c:: 
p,rposes of § 14(a) and Rnle 14a-9. It conclndes that the corre ct test is 11 whethe!" -
the omitted fact 1s of s11ch a character that it might ,have been considered im.portar.: 
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a re a sonable sha ·ebolder who w as in the process of determining how to vote. 11 
Petn at 5a-12a. Drawing snpport from Affiliated Ute itizens v. United States, 406 
------------~---------~----~~ 
(2nd Cir. 1973 ), and Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co. , 489 F. 2d 5 79, 604 (5th Cir. 
1974), cert denied, u.s. --- ( 1975 ), the CA stated that relevancy alone is the ---
only test of materiality [Petn. at lOa, n. 131. It specifically rejected the significant 
t ,.... .... 
propensity test adopted by the USDC as well as other CA. 
Petr understandably argues that the Circuits are badly split on the question of 
the standard for materiality for purposes of the federal securities disclosure laws 
[Cases collected in petn at 8-91 as well as finding the 11 significant propensity 11 test 
supported by Mills. It notes that the omitted facts are not required by any SEC 
guideline on disclosure. A, proxy statement is not formulated in a laboratory, as . ,_.~.. ..... 
CA 7 assumes, bnt in the real world by fallible draftsmen and any proxy statement 
or other disclosure statement omits material which might have been considered 
I 
important by some shareholder, at least when viewed retrospectively. 
'< 
Resp generally renews the CA1 s holding, arguing that it merely repeats the 
Mills test. It argues that petr seeks to create a conflict ont of a mere ethereal 
difference in wording. Under any standard these omissions were material as a 
matter of law. And for the Court to consider this question would be shoveling smoke. 
It also urges that CA 7 1 s decision can be supported on the alternate grounds of 
governing state law and Rule 14a-3 --neither of which were considered below. 
I 
(2) Petr urges that CA 7 clearly mistJsed its snmmary judgment power in 
foreclosing this issne from jury consideration-- no matter what standard is applied. 
( 
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How, for example, could the failnre to disclose the fact that National officials, 
named in the proxy as TSC directors as well a~ officers of National, were chairme o 
of the TSC board and executive committee possibly be material as a matter of law 
in light of the disclosures in the proxy that National controlled 3 3% of TSC' s stock 
as well as 5 of 10 directors. 
Resp 1uges that s11mmary jndgment was clearly correct. 
DISCUSSION: The case appears to be an outside candidate for cert. The 
granting of summary judgment is difficult to defend and perhaps completely untenable 
on all questions save omission of the underwriter's prediction. This issne wonld not 
appear to be independently certworthy. 
There is a clear split in circuits on the standard for materiality. It snrely 
'-
must be something more than mere relevancy unless filings, prospectuses, and 
proxy statements are to become encyclopedias. On the other hand, as Jndge Friend l~.-
opinion in Gerstle indicated, the particnlar verbal formnla utilized by a conrt may 
be more smoke than essence. 
There is a response. 
O'Neill Ops in petn 
7 I 1/75 
uourt Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
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No. 74-1471 
TS~. INDUSTRIES, INC. 
v. 
NORTHWAY, INC. 
Motion of Respondent to Dispense 
with Printing Appendix 
On October 61 the Court granted cert to CA 7 in this case to consider 
the standard for materiality under §14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
Respondent (joined by petr in a separate reply) moves to dispense with 
printing an appendix and to permit the case to be heard on the original record 
together with nine letter size xeroxed sets of relevant parts of the record. 
Petr initially designated about 11 500 pages to be printed as the Appendix. Resp, 
apparently concerned that it may have to bear such cost~ if the case is reversed, 
see Rules 36(3) and 57(2) and (3)1 attempted to persuade petr to include less. 
Unsuccessful1 resp files this motion1 suggesting as an alternative that the Court 
perm1t xeroxed. cop1es o1 tfie rec ord to be filea. esp sent the Clerk for his 
inspection a set of the xeroxed appendix used in the CA. The reproductions 
are clear and the letter sized volumes are firmly bound. Petr, in a reply brief, 
joins r~sp in this motion. Both cite the high costs of printing--$20-25, 000, as 
compared to the relatively low cost of xeroxing, about $3, 500. 
DISCUSSION: As noted in my memorandum on the motion in Drew 
Municipal Separate School Dist. v. Andrews, No. 74-1318, List 3, Sheet 3 
this Conference, there have been a few of these motions filed this term. As set 
out in the Drew memorandum., the clear intent of Rule 36 is to discourage 
voluminous appendices, that an appendix should set out only relevant docket 
e ntries, etc. and only those other parts of the record to which the parties wish 
to direct the Court's particular attention. As with counsel in Drew, the members 
of the bar in this case have likewise failed "to discern" the purpose of Rule 36. 
Again, the parties may be just putting their motion badly. (As in Drew, 
the -cert petition in this case contains the opinion below, as well as the relevant 
portion of the proxy statement, the Exchange Act and certain Rules of the S. E. C.). 
However, to grant the motion on the ground given--cost--would only encourage 
fur ther motions of this typeJl and verbose and xeroxed appendices. 
The provision of Rule 36(8) that the Court may by order dispense with 
the requirement of an appendix and may permit cases to be heat:d on the original 
recordJl "with such copies of the record, or relevant parts thereof, as the Court 
may require" should be reserved only for extraordinary situations such as in the 
Calley motion, see List 3, Sheet 4, October 10 Conference, where the opinions 
(required by Rule 36(1 )) ran several hundred pages. 
Also, Rule 36(3) provides protection to resp: 
"The cost of producing the appendix 
shall be taxed as costs in the case, but if 
either party shall cause matter to be included 
in the appendix unnecessarily the Court may 
impose the cost of producing such parts on 
the party. 11 
The motion probably should be denied and the Clerk advised to contact 
the parties and discuss the matter with them. 
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I. 
business now conducted by General Out-
door"; Robbins was an outdoor adver-
tising man, not a real estate salesman. 
Indeed, at a later point the Statement 
explicitly noted that General Outdoor 
would transfer to this Skogmo subsidi-
ary "its entire outdoor advertising busi-
ness", which would "continue to be man-
aged by the same officers and substan-
tially the same directors as General Out-
door". Moreover, many, probably most, 
of the GOA stockholders receiving the 
Proxy Statement of September 11, 1963, 
had received, only ·five months earlier, 
GOA's quarterly letter of April 11, 1963, 
quoting the resolution, adopted by its di-
rectors on that day, announcing that 
GOA would continue to operate its out-
door advertising plants with the sole ex-
ception of Oklahoma City. While, ac-
cording to Robbins, this resolution was 
passed to improve employee morale, the 
combination of it with the lack of fur-
ther plant sales (save the closing of the 
Oklahoma City sale) contributed to the 
misleading character of the statement of 
intention in the Proxy Statement. 
We recognize that, in thus branding 
the Proxy Statement as misleading, the 
district judge and we possess an advan-
tage of hindsight that was not available 
to the draftsman. It would not have 
been proper to say that Skogmo was 
going to sell all the remaining plants, 
when, even with the encouragement that 
had been received, there was no assur-
ance that it could do this on satisfactory 
terms. But the English language has 
sufficient resources that the draftsman 
could have done better than he did and 
more accurately expressed Skogmo's true 
intention to the stockholders. If only 
the first sentence of the fateful para-
16. Our discussion of this voint is limited 
to the rights of versons who were in· 
vitcu by a proxy statement to t>articipatc 
in the taking of cort>orate action involving 
a change in the cbaractcr of their 
securities, as in a sale of assets or a con-
solidation or merger. It docs not include 
persons who bave traded bc(·ause of in-
formation in such a proxy statement, for 
wbom the statement would seem to stand 
no differently from, say, an annual re-
graph had said something like "includ-
ing a policy of aggressively seeking to 
dispose of the remaining outdoor adver-
tising branches or subsidiaries of Gener-
al Outdoor through sales to acceptable 
prospective purchasers on advantageous 
terms in the range of those that have 
been achieved in the past," we would at 
least have had a very different case. 
B. What Is the Standard of Culpabil-
ity in Suits Tor Darnages for Vio-
lation of Rule V,a-9? 
In contrast to the large quantity of 
ink that has been spilled on the issue 
whether a plaintiff seeking damages un-
der Rule 10b- 5 must make some showing 
of "scienter" and, if so, what, there has 
been little discussion of what a plaintiff 
alleging ama e ecause o a VJO a ·on 
of~) must show in the way 
of culpability o~part of a 
defendant.16 Neither of the Supreme 
Court decision ac­
tions un er section 14(a), J. I. Case Co. 
v. ~S. 426, 84 S.Ct. 
1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423, or Mills v. Electric 
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 
616, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970), casts light 
on the pr.obleJil. 
Judge Bartels held, 298 F.Supp. at 97, 
that "the basis for incorporating scien-
ter into a Rule 10b-5 action does not ex-
ist in a Rule 14a- 9 suit," and that "Neg-
ligence alone either in making a misrep-
resentation or in failing to disclose a 
material fact in connection with proxy 
solicitation is sufficient to warrant re-
covery." The judge agreed in substance 
with Judge Mansfield's analysis in Rich-
land v. Crandall, supra, 262 F.Supp. at 
553 n.12, to the effect that one strong 
ground for holding that Rule 10b-5 re-
port to stockhohlers. \Yc likewise tlo not 
pass on the J>rindples that should govern 
liability of tlirc(·tors and other indivitluals 
having some res]>onsibility for sudt a 
statement, as distinguished from a con-
trolling corporation which has been the 
hcncfitiary of the action that was induecd. 
See Jennings & Marsh, Securities Regula-
tion: Cases nnd Materials 1358-5!) (3d 
eel. 1972). 
GERSTLE v. GAMBLE-SKOGMO, INC. 1299 
Cite as 478 F.2d 1281 (1973) 
quires a showing of something more 
than negligence in an action for dam-
ages is that the statutory authority for 
the Rule, section 10 (b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, is ad-
dressed to "any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance," a point later 
stressed in the writer's concurring opin-
ion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 
401 F.2d 833, 868 (2 Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 976, 89 S.Ct. 1454, 22 L. 
Ed.2d 756 (1969), whereas section 14(a) 
contains no such evil-sounding language. 
We think there is much force in this. 
See Gould v. American Hawaiian S. S. 
Co., 351 F.Supp. 853, 861- 863 (D.Del. 
1972) ; 5 Loss, Securities Regulation 
2864- 65 (2d ed. supp.1969). Although 
the language of Rule 14a- 9(a) closely 
parallels that of Rule 10b-5, and neither 
says in so many words that scienter 
should be a requirement, one of the pri-
mary reasons that this court has held 
that this is required in a private action 
under Rule 10b-5, Shemtob v. Shearson, 
Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2 
Cir. 1971); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 
479 F.2d 1277, 1304, 1305 (2 Cir. 1973), 
I 
is a concern that without some such re-
quirement the Rule might be invalid as 
exceeding the Commission's authority 
under section 10(b) to regulate "manipu-
lative or deceptive devices." See SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., supra, 401 F.2d 
at 868 (Friendly, J., concurring); Lan-
17. For similar reasons, we do not think 
that this court's rN'Cnt hohling in Chris-
f'mft Irulustries, In('. v. Piver Aircraft 
Corp., supra, 480 F.2d at 362, that 
scienter must be proved in a private aetion 
under sed ion 1-1 (c) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, in whic-h Congress in 1968 
acloptcd the language of Rule 10b- 5 and 
applied it to tenclcr offen.;, is inconsistent 
with the result we reach here. In that 
connection Judge Mansfield noted, 480 F. 
2d at 397: 
Congress' usc of the words "fraudu-
lent," "def"eptive" and "manivulath·e" 
in § 14 (e), when coupled with the 
vartially similar language atul the legis-
lative history of the carlicr-cna<-tcd § 
lO(b), indieates that its tmrpo~c was not 
to Jlunish mere ncgligcnrc 
18. It has hccn arguccl that imtlosing lia-
bility for negligent misrepresentations or 
za v. Drexel & Co., supra, 479 F.2d at 
1305; 3 Loss, supra, at 1766 (2d ed. 
1962); 6 id. at 3883-85 (Supp.1969). 
In contrast, the scope of the rulemaking 
~~)' authority granted under section 14(a IS 
ing to a! proxy regulation 
''necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of inves-
tors" and not limited by any words con-
noting fraud or deception. This lan-
guage suggests that rather than empha-
sizing the prohibition of fraudulent con-
duct on the part of insiders to a securi-
ties transaction, as we think section 
10(b) does, in section 14(a) Congress 
was somewhat more concerned with pro-
tection of the outsider whose proxy is 
being solicited. Indeed, it was this as- ~ 
pect of the statute that the Supreme 
Court emphasized in recognizing a pri-
vate right of action for violation of sec-
tion 14(a) in Borak, 377 U.S. at 431-
432, 84 S.Ct. 1555.11 We note also that 
while an open-ended readin of Rule 
10b-5 would render the express civ1 lia-
bl 1 y prOVISIOnS 0 ts 
large y super ous, an be inconsistent 
~ons Congress built into 
these sections, see SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., supr·a, 401 F.2d at 867-868; 
3 Loss, supm, at 1785, a reading of Rule 
14a- 9 as imposing liability without 
scienter in a case like the present is 
completely compatible with the statutory 
scheme.1s 
omissions under Rule 14a-0 would be in-
consistent with the congression:1 l intent in 
enacting section 18 of the Hl3-l • \ ct, 15 
U.S.C. § 78r, whieh expressly ··reate;; lia-
bility in a private <·ivil adion for making 
materially false or misleading ,taterueuts 
in any document filed with t L.;> Commis-
sion but proviclcs that no linbil: ry shall be 
imposed if the dcfcn<lan t "ae t .;-.J in good 
faith ami h:td no knowledge that such 
statement was fa lse anrl mislea •! ing." Sec 
Gould v. American Ilawaiinn S.S. Co., 
supra, 3ril F.Suvp. at 863. But section 
18 atlplics bro:ully to any do< t:::Jen t filed 
wi'th the Commission, whcrea.-.: >-ection 14 
was spe<:ifically <li rcctc<l at vn: xy regula-
tion. :\Iorcovct·, most of the _2 ,_ ·uments 
within the scope of section IS :1 ::-.:> not dis-
tributed to stoc.:kholdcrs fot· the : -.J r~..ose of 
inducing adion; we se~ no thing 
anomalous about applying :1 C:.L"ierent 
1284 478 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
by Judge Bartels, 298 F.Supp. 66 (E.D. 
N.Y.1969), 332 F.Supp. 644 (E.D.N.Y. 
1971), and 348 F.Supp. 979 (E.D.N.Y. 
1972), along with two elaborate reports 
by the special master, Arthur H. 
Schwartz, Esq., on the amount of dam-
ages, a_ttest to the problems which the 
1scognition of a private right of actiOn 
for violation of§ 14(a) in D. Case Co. 
~. 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 
L.Ed.2d 423 (1964), have thrust upon 
the federal courts, and ·also the asSiduity 
with which the judge and the special 
master tackled them. 
I. The Facts 
The facts are stated in such detail in 
Judge Bartels' first opinion, 298 F.Supp. 
at 74- 89, that we can limit ourselves to 
those that are vital for understanding 
the issues on appeal. In order to make 
the following summary more enlighten-
ing, it will be well to state at the outset 
that the gravamen of plaintiffs' com-
plaint "concerning the Proxy Statement 
sent to GOA's stockholders was that its 
~~ disclosure that Skogmo expected to real-
~·. ,; ~ i;e farge profits from the disposition of 
JY1; ~., _.l!uch of GOA's advertising plants as had 
not been sold at the date of the merger 
J .. ,t.V w_3s jnad~ate. . 
ru GOA had been the largest company in 
the outdoor advertising business in the 
United States. It had also acquired over 
96% of the stock of Claude Neon Adver-
tising, Limited, the largest outdoor ad-
vertising company in Canada, and all the 
stock of Vendor, S.A., the largest such 
company in Mexico. Skogmo was a com-
pany engaged in wholesale and retail 
merchandising of durable and soft goods 
through subsidiaries, franchised dealers, 
and discount centers in the United 
States and Canada, and related activi-
ties. 
Between April, 1961 and March, 1962, 
Skogmo acquired 50.12% of GOA's com-
mon stock. Bertin C. Gamble, chairman 
of the board of directors and controlling 
stockholder of Skogmo, was elected to 
GOA's board in October, 1961. He was 
followed by Roy N. Gesme, a former 
consultant to Skogmo, who was to act as 
liaison between the two companies. Two 
Skogmo vice presidents were added to 
the GOA board in April, 1962. In the 
same month Gamble engaged Donald E. 
Ryan, who had no previous experience in 
the outdoor advertising business, as an 
officer of GOA, primarily in charge of 
the sale of plants, and had him elected 
as a member of the board and executive 
vice president of GOA; the district 
court found, 298 F.Supp. at 75, that 
"Ryan was indisputably Skogmo's man 
at General and was expected to evaluate 
General's prospects and make recommen-
dations to Skogmo for the future." 
There were seven other directors. Four, 
including Burr L. Robbins, the president 
of GOA, had been associated with GOA 
before Skogmo's acquisition of control; 
three were outsiders. Despite the fact 
that only five of the twelve directors 
were Skogmo men, Skogmo does not dis-
pute that it had effective control of 
GOA. 
Beginning in 1961 the outdoor adver-
tising business began to encounter seri-
ous difficulties. Disappointing reports, 
indicating that income from advertising 
plants had fallen off substantially dur-
ing 1961 and that the expected rate of 
return in the business was declining, 
were made to Gesme by the management 
in the early months of 1962. Upon as-
suming his duties in May 1962, Ryan, 
after an intensive study, reported to 
Gamble that GOA's advertising plants 
could not be operated profitably and 
should be sold. A strong impulse in 
that direction had been furnished by the 
sale, in January 1962, of GOA's St. 
Louis plant to a competitor at a price 
described as "fantastic".l After this 
sale, Gesme had prepared a detailed re-
port on the property and earnings of 
each of GOA's plants, referred to as the 
"Green Book", which listed sales prices 
for the plants, apparently calculated on 
I. The price was $2,953,000, of which $653,000 was in cash and the balance in notes, as againH 
a book value of $879,000. 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell DATE: March 4, 1976 
FROM: Greg Palm 
No. 74-1471 TSC Industries, Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc. 
I. Appropriate Standard of Materiality under § 14(a). 
The purpose of § 14(a) is "to promote 'the free exercise 
of the voting rights of stockholders' by insuring that proxies 
would be solicited with 'explanation to the stockholder of 
the real nature of the questions for which authority to cast 
his vote is sought."' Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 
U.S. 375, 381 (1970), quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1385 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. 14 S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12. See 
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Section 14(a) 
was thus intended to promote "[f]air corporate suffrage" 
H.R. Rep., supra, at 13, by conveying information to share-
holders that should be important in the decisionmaking process. 
SEC Rule 14a-9 thus proscribes solicitations "containing any 
statement which . . . is false or misleading with respect to 
any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact 
necessary to make the statements therein not false or 
misleading ...• " In Borak the Court recognized a private 
cause of action for violations of the rule and in Mills 
I 
liability was made to turn solely upon the question whether 
the statement or omission was "material". The reasoning of 
\ 
1 
the Mills Court essentially was that the section and rule 
are designed to insure that all information that may be 
2. 
significant in the decisionmaking process is conveyed to the 
shareholders. The concern of the rule is fair corporate 
I suffrage, not the inherent fairness or unfairness of a particular deal. 
The central question in this case is how to define the 
concept of materiality. CA7 defines material as including 
"all facts which a reasonable investor might consider important." 
(emphasis supplied). For the reasons elaborated by Judge 
Friendly in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 
(2d Cir. 1973), I think that this "might" test is inappropriate 
because it is "too suggestive of mere possibility, however 
unlikely." The Gerstle court cited with favor two alternative 
formulations of what appears* to be a more stringent standard: 
(1) whether "a reasonable man would attach importance [to the 
fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action in 
the transaction in question, id. (emphasis supplied); (2) 
whether "taking a properly realistic view, there is a substantial 
likelihood that the misstatement or omission may have led a 
·ki say "appears" only because much of the difference here may 
properly be characterized as alternative word choice for the 
same concept. CA7, for example, thought that the use of the 
word "reasonable" properly circumscribed the materialiti test, 
noting that it "will not reach 'trivial' and 'unrelated facts; 
neither will it fail to reach facts which may be relevant 
for some, but not for others." Pet. A.9. 
3. 
stockholder to grant a proxy to the solicitor or to withhold 
one from the other side, whereas in the absence of this he 
\l 
would have taken a contrary course. Id. (emphasis supplied). 
Although either of these formulations would point to the same 
conclusion in most cases, I prefer formulation (1) since when 
applied by lower courts formulation (2) may become tangled up 
in the notion of causality that was rejected in Mills.** 
I would, however, perhaps modify formulation (1) to the extent 
of requi ting only that there be a "significant likelihood" 
that a "reasonable investor" "would" consider the information 
"important" in arriving at a decision. The addition of the 
"significant likelihood" language would be consistent with 
Mills and the broad disclosure purpose of§ 14(a). ( I'm some-
what ambivalent about the addition of this language. I think 
that it is sound law, but am not sure that lower courts would 
not run away with it.) 
All that the Court can do in this case is to state the 
standard, and then elaborate upon it (i.e., by indicating 
that an important fact is not a fact which necessarily would 
have been controlling in a reasonable shareholder's mind in 
arriving at a decision; on the other hand it must be a fact 
which necessarily would have been controlling in a reasonable 
:;t_.,\"Either formulation, however, is probably acceptable. The 
SEC argues the test should be: "whether the misstatement or 
omission has a significant propensity to affect the judgment 
of a reasonable shareholder in the process of deciding how 
to vote." SEC Brief 4. This standard is close to formulation 
(2). 
4. 
shareholder's mind in arriving at a decision; on the other 
hand it must be a fact that a reasonable (rational) investor 
would have considered significant facts that only a few 
investors would consider important, or which even the hypothetical 
reasonable man might consider important are not material). None 
of the cases which I have read contain any totally satisfactory 
method of elaborating on the test. Thus, much of the elaboration 
will have to come in terms of the Court's discussion of the 
various material deficiencies that CA7 identified in the TSC 
Proxy. 
As a matter of "policy" I think that Judge Friendly 
identified the key reason for requiring a standard of materiality 
higher than that required by CA7. As he notes in Gerstle the 
language and purpose of § 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 strongly suggest 
that there should be no requirement of scienter to establish 
a violation. But if one is going to impose civil liability 
(a judicially created remedy) for misstatements or omissions 
it is appropriate that one impose a fairly high standard of 
relevance. In view of the purposes of the section and rule 
it is also important that the standard of materiality not be 
made too broad for the shareholders will be buried in an 
avalanche of information making it more difficult for the 
average investor to make reasoned decisions. 
II. Application of the Test 
CA7 granted summary judgment based on three sets of 
facts. I will discuss them separately below. It is my 
5. 
conclusion that only one of the sets of facts relied on is even 
arguably material as a matter of law. Moreover, several of 
the facts relied on are clearly not material under any reasonable 
test. 
A. Indicia of Control. 
CA7 initially focused on two sets of acts relating to 
Northway's potential influence over TSC management. First, 
three reports that National and TSC had filed with the SEC 
it was stated that under SEC regulations National may be 
deemed a "parent" of TSC. Second, the statement also failed 
to show that at the time the TSC board considered the 
proposed merger transaction the chairman was Stanley Yarmuth, 
National's president, and the chairman of the TSC executive 
committee was Charles Simonelli, National's executive vice 
president. CA7 found both these facts to be material as a 
matter of law. I disagree. The proxy statement indicated 
~ii)P 
quite clearly that five of TSC' s ten directors were u· \: 
t!d\•~ 
nominees. Moreover, it indicated that • · ,; owned 34% of 
TSC's stock and that no other shareholder owned over 10%. 
Given the disclosure of these facts which clearly suggest the 
possibility of control of by 
"'~C)~\ 
I think TSC that the 
omission of the existence of the "parent" filings certainly 
6. 
' . 
is not material. Although a closer question I also do not 
believe that the omission of Yarmuth's and Simonelli's 
positions at TSC is material. The proxy statements revealed 
their positions at Northway and that they were on the TSC 
board. My current view is that the additional information 
regarding their TSC board positions is merely cummulative evidence 
of control and arguably not material as a matter of law. 
(The contrary view would emphasize the substantially greater 
influence directors in these positions presumably would have 
on board decisions). 
B. Hornblower Opinion on Value of National's Warrants. 
Petitioner's Reply Brief contains an excellent discussion 
of why the omission of the letter referring to the value of 
the Northway warrants is not a material omission from the 
proxy statement. See pp. 23-32. CAl's view essentially is 
that the statement by Hornblower that TSC shareholders were 
being offered a "substantial premium over current market values" 
coupled with the tables containing the market prices of the 
Northway warrants on given dates makes the omission of a letter 
from Hornblower indicating that the "value" of the warrants 
was less than their market price (at least in comparison to 
the figures in the proxy statement) a material omission. 
CAl's view is silly. The proxy statement indicates only that 
the shareholders will be receiving a substantial premium over 
current market values. Moreover, it indicates that market 
7. 
prices were only one factor considered in reaching the conclusion 
that the market prices given in the statement are an accurate 
barometer of value or of the size of the premium. The SEC 
requires that the market prices be included in the statement. 
Northway correctly points out that the true "premium" must be 
calculated after filtering out any appreciation in the value 
of TSC common shares because of the announcement of the exchange 
offer. My current view is that the omission of the information 
contained in this letter was not material as a matter of law. 
It is evident that the investment bankers properly considered 
many factors other than current market prices in giving their 
opinion and a proxy statement cannot be expected to define 
their chain of reasoning in detail. 
C. Purchases of National Securities 
CA7 also found materia~ a matter of law the omission 
of the fact that both ?"dt g and th:?idPund, Inc., 
had acquired a substantial number of convertible 
debentures and common stock during the 19-month interval 
preceding the proxy solicitation. ]~ir transactions amounted 
~olh~ to about 8. 5% of the total u g common shares traded. 
CA7 considered Madison purchases to be material because the 
chairman of National's board is a director of Madison and 
because the president of Madison is a consultant of National 
($12,000 annual retainer). The implication that CA7 
considered derivable from this information was that National 
8. 
and Madison were coordinating their purchases to artifically 
raise the price of Jrtrtt:;t stock. The argument is that even 
if there in fact was no coordination of purchases this informa-
tion should have been revealed to the shareholders to that 
they could make their own informed decision. I suppose that 
it might not be wholly unreasonable to require the Madison 
purchases to be revealed. But if in fact there was no 
Ncdri~ 
co-ordination then it is quite likely that 77 ln us never 
considered this a material fact. Moreover, even if they did 
reveal these purchases they would also have to state their view 
that there was no coordinated purchase plan since if in fact 
there was no such plan then the unexplained information would 
mislead the shareholders in the opposite way. All this drives 
home the point that there may be some real value in not forcing 
the proxy solicitor to go through the silly exercise of 
transmitting facts only to say that because of other facts they 
are not material and may be disregarded. There is, however, a 
strong reason for requiring the purchases here to be disclosed 
since it is a somewhat subjective judgment whether Madison 
in fact did not continue its purchases in order to bolster 
1~
lE ' g stock for purposes of the TSC deal (after all, if 
they were successful in "puffing" the value of the shares the 
"puff" might in part become real once they had acquired TSC 
at a bargain rate), and this is the type of judgment § 14(a) 
and Rule 14a-9 arguably have left to the shareholders. 
(As you can tell, I am somewhat uncertain about what to do 
9. 
about this last set of information. Imposing civil liability 
for nondisclosure does seem rather harsh on these facts.) .. ~,, 
own purchases similarly are not clearly 
material. Many corporations do purchase their shares on a 
If that is the reason for the purchases here and 
they can be expected to continue unabated in the future then 
there may be no reason to require disclosure. Petitioners do 
not make this argument, however, and I'm not yet certain why 
Northway was purchasing its shares (I intend to look further 
tonight). 
A final question to be asked as to these facts is whether, 
as a matter of law, 8.5% is a "material" amount of purchases. 
To be sure these purchases would affect market prices, but I 
am not certain that the "effect" (i.e., depending on the 
market prices may have been raised several percent) is per se 
material". I think that it probably is, but want to think 
further on the subject tonight. 
III. Remand 
A remand will be necessary in any case since CA7 declined 
to pass on respondents' argument that the proposal was never 
legally approved under Delaware law because only 4 of 10 directors 
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No. 74-1471 -- TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The pr_oxy rules promulgated by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 bar the use of proxy statements that are false or mis-
leading with respect to the presentation or omission of material 
facts. We are called upon to consider. the definition of a material 
fact under those rules, and the appropriateness of resolving the 
question of materiality by summary judgment in this case. 
I 
The dispute in this case centers about the acquisition of 
petitioner TSC Industries, Inc. by petitioner National Industries, 
Inc. In February 1969 National acquired 34 o/o of TSC's voting 
securities by purchase from Charles E. Schmidt and his family. 
Schmidt, who had been TSC' s founder and principal shareholder, 
promptly resigne d along with his son from TSC' s board of directors .. 
- 2 -
Thereafter, five National nominees were placed on TSC' s board, 
Stanley R. Yarmuth, National's president and chief executive 
officer, became chairman of the TSC board, and Charles F. 
Simonelli, National's executive vice president, became chairman 
of the TSC executive committee. On October 16, 1969, the TSC 
board, with the attending National nominees abstaining, approved 
a proposal to liquidate and sell all of TSC' s assets to National. 
The proposal in substance provided for the exchange of TSC 
Common and Series 1 Preferred Stock for National Series B 
Preferred Stock and Warrants . .!/ On November 12, 1969, TSC and 
National issued a joint proxy statement to their shareholders, 
recommending approval of the proposal. The proxy solicitation 
was successful, TSC was placed in liquidation and dissolution, 
and the exchange of shares was effected. 
This is an action brought by respondent Northway, a TSC 
shareholder, against TSC and National, claiming that their joint 
proxy statement was incomplete and materially misleading in 
violation of § 14a of the Securities Exchange Act of 1834, 15 U.S. C. 
§ 78n(a),~/ and Ru1es 14a-3 and 14a-9 promulgated thereunder. 
3/ 
17 CFR §§ 240. 14a-3, 240. 14a-9 (1975).- The basis of Northway's 
claim under Rule 14a-3 is that TSC and National failed to state in .....___ 
the proxy statement that the transfer of the Schmidt interests in 
- 3 -
TSC to National had given National control of TSc.!/ The Rule 
14a-9 claim, insofar as it concerns us,2../ is that TSC and National 
omitted from the proxy statement material facts relating to the degree 
of National 1 s control over TSC and the favorability of the terms of 
6/ 
the proposal to TSC shareholders.-
Northway filed its complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois on December 4, 1969, 
the day before the shareholder meeting on the proposed transaction, 
but while it requested injunctive relief it never so moved. In 1972 
Northway amended its complaint to seek money damages, restitution, 
and other equitable relief. Shortly thereafter, Northway moved for 
summary judgment on the issue of TSC 1 s and National 1 s liability. 
The District Court denied the motion, but granted leave to appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 1292(b). The Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that there existed a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether National 1 s acquisition of the 
Schmidt interests in TSC had resulted in a change of control, 
and that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate on the Rule 
14a-3 claim. But the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court 1 s 
denial of summary judgment to Northway on its 14a-9 claims, holding - ....._ - ..... ------- --cwt --..-.... ~ 
that certain omissions of fact were material as a matter of law. 
512 F. 2 d 3 2 4 ( CA 7 19 7 5) • 
- 4 -
We granted certiorari because the standard applied by the 
Court of Appeals in resolving the question of materiality appeared 
to conflict with the standard applied by other Courts of Appeals. 
423 U.S. 820 (1975). We now hold that the Court of Appeals erred 
in ordering that partial summary judgment be granted to Northway. 
II 
A. 
As we have noted on more than one occasion, § 14a of the 
Exchange Act "was intended to promote 'the free exercise of the 
voting rights of stockholders' by ensuring that proxies would be 
solicited with 'explanation to the stockholder of the real nature of 
the questions for which authority to cast his vote is sought. '" 
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970), quoting 
H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13. See also J. I. Case 
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964); S. Rep. No. 792, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 12. In Borak, the Court held that§ 14a's 
broad remedial purposes required recognition under § 27 of the 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78aa, of an implied private right of action 
for violations of the provision. And in Mills, we attempted to clarify 
to some extent the elements of a private cause of action for violation 
of § 14a. In a suit challenging the sufficiency under § 14a and Rule 14a- 9 
of a proxy statement soliciting votes in favor of a merger, we held 
that there was no need to demonstrate that the alleged defect in the 
- 5 - ' . 
proxy statement actually had a decisive effect on the voting. So 
long as the misstatement or omission was material, it is sufficient 
to show the causal relation between violation and injury, we concluded. 
that "the proxy solicitation itself .•. was an "essential link in 
the accomplishment of the transaction." 39 6 U.S., at 385. After 
Mills, then, the content given to the notion of materiality assumes 
h · ht d · ·f· 
71 
e1g ene s1gm 1cance.-
B. 
The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an 
objective one, involving the significance of an omitted or mis-.. -
represented fact to a reasonable investor. Variations in the formulation 
of a general test of materiality occur in the articulation of just how 
significant a fact must be or, put another way. how certain it must 
be that the fact would affect a reasonable investor's judgment. 
The Court of Appeals in this case concluded that material 
facts include "all facts which a reasonable shareholder might consider 
important." 512 F. 2d, at 330 (emphasis added). This formulation 
) of the test of materiality has been explicitly rejected by at least two 
1 courts as setting too low a threshold for the imposition of liability 
under Rule 14a-9. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d 1281, 1301-
1302 ( CA 2 1973); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F. 2d 579, 
603-604 (CA 5 1974). In these cases, panels of the Second and Fifth 
'. 
- 6 -
Circuits opted for the conventional tort test of materiality --
whether a reasonable man would attach importance to the fact 
misrepresented or omitted in determining his course of action. 
See Restatement, Torts § 538(2)(a). See also ALI Federal Securities 
8/ 
Code §256(a), Tent. Draft No. 2 (1973).- Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, supra, at 1302, also approved the following standard, which 
had been formulated with reference to statements issued in a 
contes.ted election: "whether, taking a properly realistic view, 
there is a substantial likelihood that the misstatement or omission 
may have led a stockholder to grant a proxy to the solicitor or to 
withhold one from the other side, whereas in the absence of this he 
would have take n a contrary course." General Time Corp. v. 
Talley Industries , Inc .• 403 F. 2d 159, 162 (CA 2 1968), cert. denied, 
393 u.s. 1026 (1 9 69). 
In arriving at its broad definition of a material fact as one 
that a reasonable shareholder might consider important, the Court 
of Appeals in this case relied heavily upon language of this Court 
in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra. This reliance was 
misplaced. The 1\Iills Court did characterize a determination of 
materiality as at least "embod[ying] a conclusion that the defect was 
of such a character that it might have been considered important by 
a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to 
- 8 -
to ensure by judicial means that the transaction, when judged by 
its real terms, is fair and otherwise adequate, but to ensure 
disclosures by corporate management in order to enable the 
shareholders to make an informed choice. See Mills, supra, at 
381. As an abs tract proposition, the most desirable role for a court 
in a suit of this sort, coming after the consummation of the proposed 
transaction, would perhaps be to determine whether in fact the 
proposal would have been favored by the shareholders and consummated 
in the absence of any misstatement or omission. But as we recognized 
in Mills, supra, at 382 n. 5, such matters are not subject to determina-
tion with certainty. Doubts as to the critical nature of information 
misstated or omitted will be commonplace. And particularly in view 
of the prophylactic purpose of the Rule and the fact that the content 
of the proxy statement is within management's control, it is 
appropriate that these doubts be resolved in favor of those the 
statute is designed to protect. Mills, supra, at 385. 
We are aware, however, that the disclosure policy embodied 
...., ..., ,.... awa=--==--
in the proxy regulations is not without limit. See id., at 384. 
Some information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its 
disclosure may accomplish more harm than good. The potential liability 
for a Rule 14a-9 violation can be great indeed, and if the standard of . 
materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may corporations and their 
- 9 -
managements be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions 
or misstatements. but also management's fear of exposing itself 
to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the shareholder 
in an avalanche of trivial information -- a result that is hardly 
conducive to informed decisionmaking. Precisely these dangers are 
presented, we think. by the definition of a material fact adopted by 
the Court of Appeals in this case -- a fact which a reasonable shareholder 
might consider important. We agree with Judge Friendly, speaking for 
the Court of Appeals in Gerstle. that the "might" formulation is "too 
suggestive of mere possibility, however unlikely." 478 F. 2d •• 
at 1302. 
The general standard of materiality that we think best 
comports with the policies of Rule 14a-9 is as follows: an omitted 
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonab}e 
~ ..., ._,. ...... 
shareholfle.r would consider it important in deciding how to vote. 
:w::=m ........ ~ ~ ............ taw:= ...... 
This standard is fully consistent with Mills' general description of 
materiality as a requirement that "the defect have a significant 
"10/ 
propensity to affect the voting process. - It does not require 
proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What 
the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihooq 
that. under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have 
- 11 -
- 10 -
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable 
shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered 
the "total mix" of information made available . .!.!./ 
D. 
The issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed 
question of law and fact, involving as it does the application of a 
legal standard to particular set of facts. In considering whether 
. d t th . . . t 121 b summary JU gmen on e 1ssue 1s appropna e,- we must ear 
in mind that the underlying objective facts, which will often be free 
from dispute, are merely the starting point for the ultimate determi-
nation of materiality. The determination requires a delicate 
assessment of the inferences a "reasonable shareholder" would 
draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences 
to him, and these assessments are peculiarly ~nes for the trier of 
13/ 
fact.- Only if the established omissions are "so obviously 
important to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ on 
the question of materiality'' is the ultimate issue of materiality 
appropriately resolved "as a matter of law" by summary judgment. 
John Hopkins University-v. Hutton, 422 F. 2d 1124, 1129 (CA 4 1969). · 
See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F. 2d 579, 604 (CA 5 1974); 
- 12 -
exchange with National. It then concluded that the omitted facts 
were material because they were "persuasive indicators that the 
TSC board was in fact under the control of National, and that 
National thus 'sat on both sides of the table' in setting the terms 
of the exchange." 512 F. 2d, at 333. 
We do not agree that the omission of these facts, when -
viewed against the disclosures contained in the proxy statement, 
warrants the entry of summary judgment against TSC and National 
-------------~ -
on this record. Our conclusion is the same whether the omissions 
are considered separately or together. 
The proxy statement prominently displayed the facts that 
National owned 34o/o of the outstanding shares in TSC, and that no 
other person owned more than 10%. App. 262-263,267. It also 
prominently revealed that five out of ten TSC directors were 
National nominees, and it recited the positions of those National 
nominees with National -- indicating, among other things, that 
Stanley Yarmuth was president and a director of National, and that 
Charles Simonelli was executive vice president and a director of 
National. App. 2 67. These disclosures clearly revealed the nature 
~~------~--~~~--------------~ 
of National's relationship with TSC and alerted the reasonable share-
,~------------~,~--~--------~----
holder to the fact that National exercised a degree of influence over 
TSC. In view of these disclosures, we certainly cannot say that the 
- 13 -
additional facts that Yarmuth was chairman of the TSC board of 
directors and Simonelli chairman of its executive committee were, 
on this record, so obviously important that reasonable minds could 
not differ on their materiality. 
Nor can we say that it was materially misleading as a 
matter of law for TSC and National to have omitted reference to 
SEC filings indicating that National "may be deemed to be a parent 
of TSC." As we have already noted, both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals concluded, in denying summary judgment on the 
Rule 14a-3 claim, that there was a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether National actually controlled TSC at the time of the proxy 
solicitation. We must assume for present purposes, then, that 
National did not control TSC. On that assumption, TSC and 
National obviously had no duty to state without qualification that 
control did exist. If the proxy statements were to disclose the 
conclusory statements in the SEC filings that National 11 may be 
deemed to be a parent of TSC," then it would have been appropriate, 
if not necessary, for the statement to have included a disclaimer 
of National control over TSC or a disclaimer of knowledge as to 
15/ 
whether National controlled TSC.- The net contribution of 
including the contents of the SEC filings accompanied by such 
'· 
- 14 -
disclailners is not of such obvious significance, in view of the 
other facts contained in the proxy statement, that their exclusion 
renders the statement materially misleading as a matter of law ):.2../ 
B. Favorability of the Terms to TSC Shareholders 
The Court of Appeals also found that the failure to disclose 
two sets of facts rendered the proxy statement materially deficient 
in its presentation of the favorability of the terms of the proposed 
transaction to TSC shareholders. The first omission was of 
information, described by the Court of Appeals as "bad news" for 
TSC shareholders, contained in a letter from an investment banki~g 
firm whose earlier favorable opinion of the fairness of the proposed 
transaction was reported in the proxy statement. The second omission 
related to purchases of National common stock by National and by 
Madison Fund, Inc., a large mutual fund, during the two years 
prior to the issuance of the proxy statement. 
1. 
The proxy statement revealed that the investment banking 
firm of Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes had rendered a 
favorable opinion on the fairness to TSC shareholders of the terms 
for the exchange of TSC shares for National securities. In that 
opinion, the proxy statement explained, the firm had considered, 
"among other things, the current market prices of the securities 
- 15 -
of both corporations, the high redemption price of the National 
Series B Preferred Stock, the dividend and debt service requirements 
of both corporations, the substantial premium over current market 
values represented by the securities being offered to TSC stock-
holders, and the increased dividend income." App. 2 67. 
The Court of Appeals focused upon the reference to the 
"substantial premium over current market values represented 
by the securities being offered to TSC stockholders," and noted 
that any TSC shareholder could calculate the apparent premium by 
reference to the table of current market prices that appeared four 
pages later in the proxy statement. App. 271. On the basis of the 
recited closing prices for November 7, 1969, ,five days before the issuance 
of the proxy statement, the apparent premiums were as follows. 
Each share of TSC Series 1 Preferred, which closed at $12.00, 
-
would bring National Series B Preferred Stock and National Warrants 
worth $15.23 --for a premium of $3 . 23, or 27% of the market value 
of the TSC Series 1 Preferred. Each share of TSC Common Stock, 
which closed at $13. 25, would bring National Series B Preferred 
Stock and National Warrants worth $16. 19 -- for a premium of $2. 94, 
or 22% of the market value of TSC Common.12/ 
The closing price of the National Warrants on November 7, 1969, 
was, as indicated in the proxy statement, $5. 25. The TSC shareholders 
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were misled, the Court of Appeals concluded, by the proxy 
statement's failure to disclose that in a communication two we eks 
after its favorable opinion letter, the Hornblower firm revealed 
that its determination of the fairness of the offer to TSC was based 
on the conclusion that the value of the Warrants involved in the 
transaction would not be their current market price, but approximately 
$3. 50. If the Warrants were valued at $3.50 rather than $5. 25, and 
the other securities valued at the November 7 closing price, the 
Court figured, the apparent premium would be substantially reduced --
from $3. 23 (27o/o) to $ 1.48 (12o/o) in the case of TSC Preferred, and 
from $2.94 (22 o/o) to$. 31 (2o/o) in the case of TSC Common. "In 
simple terms," the Court concluded, "TSC and National had received 
some good news and some bad news from the Hornblower firm. They 
chose to publish the good news and omit the bad news." 512 F. 2d, at 335. 
It would appear, however, that the subsequent communication 
from the Hornblower firm, which the Court of Appeals felt contained 
"bad news," contained nothing new at all. At the TSC board of 
directors meeting held on October 16, 19 69, the date of the initial 
Hornblower opinion letter, Blancke Noyes, a TSC director and a partner 
in the Hornblower firm, had pointed out the likelihood of a decline 
in the market price of National Warrants with the issuance of the 




conclusion that the exchange offer was a fair one nevertheless. 
The subsequent Hornblower letter. signed by Mr. Noyes. 
----------~-------------
purported merely to explain the basis of the calculations underlying 
the favorable opinion rendered in the October 16th letter. "In 
advising TSC as to the fairness of the offer from [National]. 
Mr. Noyes wrote. "we concluded that the warrants in question had 
a value of approximately $3. 50." lfl/ On its face. then. the 
subsequent letter from Hornblower does not appear to have contained 
anything to alter the favorable opinion rendered in the October 16th 
letter -- including the conclusion that the securities being offered 
to TSC shareholders represented a "substantial premium over 
current market values." 
The real question. though. is not whether the subsequent 
Hornblower letter contained anything that altered the Hornblower 
opinion in any \vay. It is rather whether the advice given at the 
October 16th meeting. and reduced to more pre.cise terms in the 
subsequent Hornblower letter -- that there may be a decline in the 
market price of the National Warrants -- had to be disclosed in order 
to clarify the import of the proxy statement's reference to "the 
substantial premium over current market values represented by 
the securities being offered to TSC stockholders." We note initially 
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that the proxy statement referred to the substantial premium as 
but one of several factors considered by Hornblower in rendering 
its favorable opinion of the terms of exchange. Still, we cannot 
assume that a TSC shareholder would focus only on the "bottom line" 
of the opinion to the exclusion of the considerations that produced it. 
TSC and National insist that the reference to a substantial 
premium required no clarification or supplementation, for the reason 
that there was a substantial premium even if the National Warrants 
are assumed to have been worth $3. 50. In reaching the contrary 
conclusion, the Court of Appeals, they contend, ignored the rise in 
price of TSC securities between the early October 1969 reference 
point for the Hornblower opinion and November 7. 1969 -- a rise in 
price that they suggest was a result of the favorable exchange ratio's 
becoming public knowledge. When the proxy statement was mailed, 
TSC and National contend, the market price of TSC securities 
already reflected a protion of the premium to which Hornblower had 
referred in rendering its favorable opinion of the terms of exchange. 
Thus, they note that Hornblower assessed the fairness of the proposed 
transaction by reference to early October market prices of TSC 
Preferred, TSC Common, and National Preferred. On the basis of 
those prices and a $3. 50 value for the National Warrants involved 
in the exchange. TSC and National contend that the premium was 
substantial. Each share of TSC Preferred, selling in early October 
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at $11. would bring National Preferred Stock and Warrants worth 
$13. 50 -- for a premium of $2. 10, or 19%. And each share of 
in 
TSC Common, selling/early October at $11. 63, would bring 
National Preferred Stock and Warrants worth $13.25 --for a 
19/ 
premium of $1. 62. or 14%.- We certainly cannot say as a matter 
of law that these premiums were not substantial. And if. as we must 
assume in considering the appropriateness of summary judgment. 
the increase in price of TSC' s securities from early October to 
November 7 reflected in large part the market's reaction to the 
terms of the proposed exchange, it was not materially misleading 
as a matter of law for the proxy statement to refer to the existence 
of a substantial premium. 
There remains the possibility, however, that although TSC 
and National may be correct in urging the existence of a substantial 
premium based upon a $3. 50 value for the National Warrants and 
the early October market prices of the other securities involved 
in the transaction. the proxy statement misled the TSC shareholder 
to calculate a premium substantially in excess of that premium. 
-~<:~---------------~,--------------------------------------
The premiums apparent from early October market prices and 
a $3. 50 value for the National Warrants -- 19% on TSC Preferred 
and 14% on TSC Common-- were certainly less than those that would 
have been derived through use of the November 7 closing prices listed 
! ' 
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in the proxy statement -- 27% on TSC Preferred and 22% on TSC 
Common. But we are unwilling to sustain a grant of summary 
judgment to Northway on that basis. To do so we would have to 
conclude as a matter of law, first, that the proxy statement would 
have misled the TSC shareholder to calculate his premium on the 
basis of November 7 market prices, and second, that the difference 
between that premium and that which would be apparent from early 
October prices and a $3. 50 value for the National Warrants was 
material. These are questions we think best left to the trier of fact. 
2. 
The final omission that concerns us relates to purchases of 
National Common Stock by National and by Madison Fund, Inc., a 
mutual fund. Northway notes that National's board chairman was a 
director of Madison, and that Madison's president and chief executive, 
Edward Merkle, was employed by National pursuant to an agreement 
obligating him to provide at least one day per month for such duties 
20/ 
as National might request. Northway contends that the proxy 
statement, having called the TSC shareholder's attention to the market 
prices of the securities involved in the proposed transaction, should 
have revealed substantial purchases of National Common Stock made 
by National and l\ladison during the two years prior to the issuance 
of the proxy statement.Q/ In particular, Northway contends that 
l 
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the TSC shareholders should, as a matter of law, have been informed 
that National and Madison purchases accounted for 8. 5o/o of all 
reported transactions in National Common Stock during the period 
between National's acquisition of the Schmidt interests and the proxy 
solicitation. The theory behind Northway's contention is that 
disclosure of these purchases would have pointed to the existence, 
or at least the possible existence, of conspiratorial manipulation of 
the price of National Common Stock. which would have had an effect 
on thE; market price of the National Preferred Stock and Warrants 
involved in the proposed transaction.E./ 
Before the District Court, Northway attempted to demonstrate 
that the National and Madison purchases were coordinated. The 
District Court concluded, however, that there was a genuine issue 
of fact as to whether there was coordination. Finding that a showing 
of coordination was essential to Northway's theory, the District Court 
denied summary judgment. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that 
"collusion is not conclusively established." 512 F. 2d, at 336. But 
observing that "it is certainly suggested, " ibid., the Court concluded 
that the failure to disclose the purchases was materially misleading 
as a matter of law. The Court explained: 
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"Stockholders contemplating an offer involving 
preferred shares convertible to common stock 
and warrants for the purchase of common stock 
must be informed of circumstances which tend 
to indicate that the current selling price of the 
common stock involved may be affected by apparent 
market manipulations. It was for the shareholders 
to determine whether the market price of the common 
shares was relevant to their evaluation of the 
convertible preferred shares and warrants, or whether 
the activities of Madison and National actually 
amounted to manipulation at all." Ibid. 
In short, while the Court of Appeals viewed the purchases as 
significant only insofar as they suggested manipulation of the price 
of National securities, and acknowledged the existence of a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether there was any manipulation, the Court 
nevertheless required disclosure to enable the shareholders to 
decide whether there was manipulation or not. 
The Court of Appeals' approach would sanction the imposition 
of civil liability on a theory that undisclosed information may suggest 
the existence of market manipulation, even if the responsible corporate 
officials knew that there was in fact no market manipulation. We do -.... ~ awt ~ 
~ ,. .. 
.~ . 
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not agree that Rule 14a-9 requires such a result. Rule 14a-9 is 
concerned only with whether a proxy statement is misleading with 
respect to its presentation of material facts. If, as we must assume 
on a motion for summary judgment, there was no collusion or 
manipulation whatsoever in the National and Madison purchases 
that is, if the purchases were made wholly independently for proper 
corporate and investment purposes, then by Northway's implicit 
acknowledgment they had no bearing on the soundness and reliability 
of the market prices listed in the proxy statement, ?:.ll and it cannot 
have been materially misleading to fail to disclose them. 
241 
That is not to say, of course, that the SEC could not enact 
a rule specifically requiring the disclosure of purchases such as were 
involved in this case, without regard to whether the purchases can 
be shown to have been collusive or manipulative. We simply hold 
that if liability is to be imposed upon a theory that it was misleading 
to fail to disclose purchases suggestive of market manipulation, 
. . . . 25 / 
there must be some showmg that there was 1n fact market mampulatwn.-
IV 
In summary, none of the omissions claimed to have been in 
violation of Rule 14a-9 were, so far as the record reveals, materially 
misleading as a matter of law, and Northway was not entitled to 
} 
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partial summary judgment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.$5ttpume <!ftmrl Llf t4t Jit±ttb- ~ta:Us 
:.ra:$lfingfun.liJ. <!f. 211?'1-~ 
June 9, 1976 
Re: 74-1471 - TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 
Dear Thurgood: 
I join your proposed opinion dated June 2. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
~n:p-umt ~Mlrl of tJrt ~th ~bdts 
,ragfringhttt. ~. ~· 2llfiJI.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
-JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 9, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1471 - TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
s~ 
.... . . 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to Conference 
.:§u:p-rtutt ~curl o-f tltt 'Jllttittb ;itatts 
~as!rittgtritt:.l9. ~- 2ll.;tn:~ · 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Re: No. 74-1471 - TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway 
Dear Thurgood: 
It is my understanding that footnote 11 will be withdrawn. 




Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
No. 74-1471 TSC Industries 




.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.iuprmtt <!fqmt of t!rt ~ttittb .~tatts 
.. asfrittghm. ~. <!f. 2.(l~Jl.~ 
June 7, 1976 
No. 74-1471, TSC Industries v. Northway 
Dear Thurgood, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 




I. ':::l ' . ' 
/ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMB E R S OF 
~tqtrttttt <!Jo-u:d of tltt 2Jlu-iicb ~tattg 
lnaslyingLttt, 10. <q. 20~J!..;t 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR. 
June 7, 1976 
RE: No. 74-1471 TSC Industries v. Northway 
Dear Thurgood: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 








.:inprtmt <!}:ltllrl d fltt ~b ,jtattg 
-agfri:ngton. !l. <q:. 2.llc?~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 7, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1471 - TSC Industries v. Northway 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
' 
Mr. Justice Marshall 

















"' ~ ::a 
" 
... ., 4' ~s-t +:-- "'-l ' ~~I 
VJ 






" ~ "' { " ~ I-' ~ " 0'1 
~ 
CJ 
~1 H p II: p.. 
c 0'\ ~ Cll 
rt "~ to ti 
!-'· ro 
Cll 









~ :>-l ::a 
::r-..~ ~ ...__, 
6' ~ ~ 
I 
